On Defining “Art”

In the essay “Definitions Of Art”, Stephen Davies introduces attempts to define art−meaning, to declare a set of properties both necessary and sufficient condition for a thing to be an art work−from differrent epochs of history of art and philosophy. From the early arguments of the discussion, he associates the quest for a definition with the existence of an essence of the thing to be defined. There has been diverse definitions for art in history: for Plato, art is imitation and representation of reality, thus inferior to the reality; for Tolstoy, it is a medium to convey emotions; some have interpreted art by focusing on its formal properties whereas some have taken its intuitive and expressive side at the focus of their proposed definitions. There are two common properties of these earlier definitions: first the fact that they do not universally hold for each and every art work fails them qualify as a definition to express what is essential in an art work, second that they presuppose the fact that the concept of art is a definable concept−meaning, they never question the possibility that the art does not have an unchanging essence making it an undefinable concept. Davies goes on with the arguments of Moris Weits (1956), who proposes that art works are linked together by a family resemblances and they do not have an unchanging essence. The argument of Weits declares the question “What is art?” meaningless, instead one is left alone with a rather  wide-scope quest for the properties of the concept and character of art itself. From 1960s onwards, the two main complex relational properties that are essential to the character of art are introduced and discussed: functional and procedural relations. According to functionalist like Beardsley and Zangwill, the unifying relation of all art works is their function to provide a pleasurable aesthetic experience. On the other hand, proceduralists like Dickie claims that the analysis of the work of art has two characteristics: first, it is an artefact, second it is contemplated as  an object of appreciation by the components of an Artworld. These two approaches have their own defects. Functionalist conceptualization of art falls short to account for the avant-garde art works of artists like Duchamp, whose “ready-mades” are considered as artwork mainly for it satisfies some institutional requirements. The proceduralists, on the other side, except for accounting for some problems that funcrionalism confronts for its making institutions central to the whole account, cannot escape a rather more important problem of Artworld relativity−meaning its unavailably declaring an Artworld, usually that of Western society, as a reference point for the other Artworlds belonging to other societies. Also there exists historically reflexive definitions of art, like that of Danto’s, which define an artwork with its historical position and the relation it builds with the past and future artworks. These relations can be exemplified as reference, repetition, amplification, repudiation and so on. It is obvious for me that every intengible definition of art has to be in some way or another historical, because this point of view accounts for why does what the moderns call “art” does not and could possibly not be thought of as “art” by classicals. Thus the importance of hybrid definitions moulding functional, procedural and historical approaches for defining art becomes clear. Davies, upon proposing hybrid definitions of art to define art with more comprehensive relations without taking the defecys of each approaches, points out once more the threat of the Artworld relativity problem and reminds theoricians of the importance of the sensitivity to existence and influence of different Artworlds in the universal domain of art.

In the opening of her essay “Beauty”, McMahon lays out the question of the type of pleasure relevant to experience of beauty as the central question regarding beauty. She gives two completely opposite definitions of  beauty by Tertullian and Plotinus, as “evil” and “a manifestation of the divine on earth”. This obvious disagreement on the very same concept shows how difficult to think about it and the ongoing disagreement about the type of pleasures that the beauty causes. McMahon, before arguing on what she calls “the main problem”, directs two more questions on the concept of beauty. First question is whether beauty is objective or subjective. This distinction is captured in Middle Ages with the dualism of apparent versus real beauty. Coming on to the 18th century philosophy, it is replaced by the absolute beauty (of conceiving the nature, for example) and the relative beauty (relative to its objective function). Especially in our contemporary world, perception is set as a presupposition for beauty, which transforms the strict duality between objective and subjective milder: beauty is a subjective response caused by the objective properties of a thing contemplated. Second question McMahon formulizes is whether there are any principles of beuty or not. The objective principles residing in the thing itself are far from being declared as a principle for beauty, because an objective quality of an object does not regarded as beutiful when confronted in another object. Thus, a Kantian approach arguing for the common objective faculties shared by contemplaters who perceive a thing as beautiful or not seems the most plausible priniple of beauty: Subjective contemplations based on objective common faculties. Coming thus to the main question McMahon sets at the beginning of her article−that is the question of the type of pleasure experienced in beauty−one confronts two mainstream roads: Platonically-inclined and hedonistically-inclined. Following the former road, one can trace back to the Western aesthetics as Christianity is influenced by Platonic philosophy a great deal. The other path gets one to the egocentrically-based pleasures and Freud’s pleasure-principle idea, seemingly the dominating characteristics of the contemporary Western culture. From a contemporary point of view, McMahon challenges again this strict duality between the form and pleause as the initiator of the experience one finds in beauty. She concludes with pointing out the relations between formal properties of objects and the pleasure taken from them by experiencing them with one’s senses are interrelated.

Goldman, in the article “The Aesthetic”, discusses the concepts aesthetic attitude, aesthetic properties, aesthetic experience.  The first use of the term “aesthetic” is by philosopher Baumgarten, he uses it to refer simply the “sensuous knowledge”. Kant later took the term to qualify the judgements of beauty in art and nature. Yet, today not only its application is restricted to the beauty alone but also it qualifies properties, attitudes and experiences other than judgements. Aesthetic properties require taste in the subject experiencing, unlike non-aesthetic properties for which the mere senses are enough to declare the objective properties residing in the object. That is the aesthetic properties are not merely the properties inherent in the object, but they also require a subjective attempt to experience: An artwork beautiful or impressive for one may not be so for another experiencer. Thus, the existence of aesthetic properties does not always entail the existence of an artwork, for its huge dependence upon the observer. For Kant, aesthetic experience of the observer preceedes the aesthetic judgements that he rather focused in his aesthetic theory. This recognition of importance of aesthetic experience is inevitable once one is confronted with the fact that aesthetic properties and beauty is not essentially inherent in the object, but they gain importance with the collaboration with the subjective effort of the observer. Unlike Dewey and Beardsley, Zemach points out to the existence of the negative aesthetic properties like ugliness. Thus the presupposed unity and coherence in the experience occuring in the faculties of the object is denied. The coherence and continuity in the object does not entail a coherent experience. Goldman claims that to experience aesthetically is to challenge one’s capacities of intellect and emotions. Thus, not only sophisticated works of art may provide it, but one may experience it on an encounter with the nature. Lastly, the aesthetic attitude has been characterized with the term “disinterest”−lack of practical gains from the object−, one cannot deny the active involvement of the subject in the aesthetic experience making him kind of “better off” with the authenticity of the object he perceives aesthetically. And the concept of “emotional detachment” introduced by Bullough (1912) seems rather a simplification to express the proper aesthetic attitude.

To conclude, what I see in these three essays in common is their rupture from essentialism in defining and thinking about art and the related concepts. They reflect the passage to the conceptualisation for art, beauty and aesthetic of modern art, as it is clear from their reflecting upon Kant, the initiator of modern philosophy, and upon his Copernican Revolution inverting the reference point of perception−thus, of art−from object to subject.