Aristotle, upon introducing the wisdom as “knowledge having to do with certain principles and causes[1]” and the Metaphysics, or the First Philosophy as he names it, as “a kind of a science whose remit is being qua being and the things pertaining to that which is per se[2]”, commits himself to the study of substance. For the substance has an independent existence by definition, giving an account of the idea of substance is an appropriate starting point of such investigation of being. As the connotations of substance are form, definition, essence, universal or kind; this poses a question of how the hylomorphic account of reality held by Aristotle can account for matter and the world of seemingly constant change. Considering the fact that with the introduction of temporality to this matter and form distinction ‒or to be more precise matter and form unity in hylomorphic account‒, the picture becomes more complicated; it requires another approach to the question of being. This approach, as I take it, is introduced with the concepts potentiality and actuality in the Book Θ of Metaphysics.
Potentiality, to begin with, is defined in Theta 1 as “a principle of change either for something else or for the thing that is in qua something else[3]”. With this conception of potentiality emphasizing mainly its process and change side, Aristotle distinguishes between active and passive potentialities according to where the potentiality belongs (whether to the thing affected or the agent of the change). Later he argues on the distinction between the rational potentiality, in which the potentiality for change has a reflective account of its activity and has capacity to go in two opposite directions, and the irrational potentiality. This distinction coincides with the natural and the acquired potentialities distinction; that is the possessor of a rational potentiality can decide to use it in any two opposite directions without being bounded by natural laws. Also, every potentiality has a determinate objective; that is to say, it has the potentiality for a certain actuality, at a certain time and at a certain place. This adherence makes his previous claims about the non-equivalence of actuality and potentiality and every potentialities’ fate to be in some way actualized, more grounded. Regarding the potentiality as capacity for change or process leads one to question whether the complete or incomplete actions in these procedures deserve higher appraisal. For Aristotle, as the complete kind of action has the highest realization of the concept of the being because it not only has the mere process among its goals but also he has realized something substantially well-grounded. This complete action can be associated with actuality and it comes in degrees. Notwithstanding, there are conditions for the prerequisites of being a potentiality for another thing. In Theta 7, Aristotle claims the matter which a thing is made is potentiality for the thing, and for the thing has the form of what it is, it is actuality of the matter it is composed of.
Given we are talking about a process and the degree of realization of a form in this process, it is legitimate to introduce temporal priority and other types of priority to explain the relation of matter to the form, or the capacity for a process to the continuing process itself. In the Theta 8, Aristotle provides the three ways in which the actuality is prior to the potentiality in three distinct arguments. Actuality has a priority over the potentiality epistemologically, ontologically and temporally at the same time. I will consider these arguments and compare them, whether they share (or, can share) a common ground in any respect.
The epistemological priority of the actual over the potential is closely related to the epistemic agent who tries to make sense of the reality by conceptualizing it intelligibly. According to Aristotle, what makes this account intelligible over other accounts is its compliance to a certain ratio or logos. Aristotle gives the example of a wood having several potentialities at the same time, for example potentiality to be a bowl and the potentiality to be a bridge. It is obvious that an epistemic agent searching the prevailing truth beneath the things as they are in themselves cannot be satisfied with this contingency of two potentialities. If an object has a potentiality to achieve something, it is never certain that it achieves it or not; especially in the rational potentialities where the will of the agent plays an important role along with external contributers. It is impossible to have a conception of a potentiality without having a conception of actuality; because, the actuality is regarded as a purpose to shape the whole process towards itself, thus making impossible to understand the individual components of the process without understanding of itself first. To make a sense of a single piece of wood, one should consider them in the context it is brought from. One can only argue that, say, this specific piece of wood is not appropriate compared to others to be used in making the bridge given one has the concept of appropriate bridge in one’s conceptual framework. Then, the same person, having the concept of a bowl, can claim that this piece of wood would better compose the bowl. In this case, the knowing-agent can put the single concepts together in a meaningful context and can posit truth to this conceptualization as an epistemic agent[4] ; and the fact that one can posit truth or falsity to a conceptualization of a reality implies that this person has given an intelligible account of this reality (as the account’s intelligibility is not curtailed by the contingencies of possible potentialities). As it can be seen in the example above, it could be possible only by comprehending the actuality that presents itself as the totality of the procedure, or as Aristotle claims the telos of the whole process (therefore it moves the process towards itself and again makes the understanding of this telos a prerequisite for the total understanding of the process).
The second argument about priority is the ontological priority of actuality over potentiality. In fact in the first argument of priority given above, we are faced with an agent who tries to comprehend the world as it is in itself and directs his whole capacities to conceptualize intelligibly that reality. Considered in this respect, epistemological and ontological arguments are closely interrelated, contrary to Cartesian case of different hierarchies of reality relative to epistemology and ontology. Both are on the side of the form against the matter; yet the one in terms of understandibility of the reality for the perceiving-agent, the other in terms of reality as it is in itself. The form as substantial priority given in this ontological argument is nothing distinct than what the knowing-agent wants to know and turns his capacities. In the ontological priority argument, Aristotle equates the actuality with the form; this fact is enough for him to say that “things posterior in production have formal and substantial priority[5]”. The thing posterior in production has the form which mere matter lacks in its contingent potentiality, and this form is what takes the process towards itself, playing the role of a telos in this system. What is more, Aristotle claims that the actuality contains not only the telos or the final achievement but it also contains the whole process in itself[6]. The form is the initiator of the processes, because it is in a more completed state of reality than the capacity for a process itself. As a part of this reality, our epistemic apparatus confines itself by turning itself to the knowledge of more completed states, and that is why I mentioned Aristotle’s concept of wisdom at the beginning of the paper: Aristotle does not seem to differentiate between the real world with certain principles and causes and the human beings who have the capacity to understand those causes and principles for the sake of their being part of that reality and it lies in their nature to get pleasure in such kind of epistemic processes.
The last crucial point about the ontological priority argument (in fact the second part of the argument) is appropriate for me to consider just before turning to the temporal priority argument, because this last considerations seem to me that they are related to the problem that occurs in the priority in time argument. In this part of the argument, Aristotle lays the issue that the eternal is fully actual because it has no change that is associated with the potentiality and imperfection. As a full actuality, they are necessary and therefore cannot be thought to exist in potentiality. The eternal beings are prior in substance to the perishable beings (the things in our-world), they are in no need to labor to actualize themselves one degree more; only the substance as matter and potentiality are cursed to labor to actualize itself, not the eternal. The function of eternal is the same as the form in previous arguments: It directs the processes towards itself and it gives aspiration the processes, having also a priority over every principle of process.
Temporal priority argument, which seems at first glance understandable after considering Aristotle’s secondary substances, is for me the most problematic part of the whole account. For Aristotle, the chicken comes before the egg temporally, yet the chicken that comes after the egg need not be the numerically same chicken as the former. As Aristotle commits himself to secondary substances as kinds, this does not lead contradiction. On this basis, the argument works well, while getting out of individual, but still lingering around the material beings. However, I think that with his overall conception of time, it is not plausible to say that every actuality is prior to the related potentiality of theirs. To explain this, Aristotle’s rather common sense notion of time (but which leads oddities in most of the cases), can be provided as Aristotle talks about it in the Physics.
Aristotle, exhibits a presentist points of view with respect to the ontology of time throughout the Book 4 of the Physics. Aristotle, here explicates that change and time defined by one another; time is kind of a means by which the movement can be numerically estimated. This change in time occurs with respect to before and after. Those two (before and after) are defined in terms of now, “It is the now that measures time,[7]” he asserts which means now, the instant of present, is what differentiates between before and after thus causing movement by flowing along a line as a one single point called “now”. One can realize the priority given to the present here. Yet, for Aristotle the eternal things are not in time, as they are fully actual and can be subject to no change. When one considers the eternal being, which is given the status of being the incentive of all other beings’ motion turning towards itself, as being outside of time, there is no way to decide whether it comes before or after the all potentialities from different degrees. The fact that there exists a sharp distinction between the eternalist other-worldly time and the presentist this-worldly time, it makes the temporality argument questionable (though it is still in a way best compatible position of Aristotle holding that the God as first-mover). Taking the presentist claim a step further, for not that I have enough justification to but only in search of a possible conception of time, and holding that only the present is actual and real; in terms of Aristotle’s account the potentialities must be in the future (after “now”, or not-yet-now), as actuality is temporally prior. This framework is very close to the Heidegger’s understanding of temporality as reflecting oneself into the future world of possibilities and committing the actualities at the present. However, in Heidegger’s account, unlike Aristotle, the agent has right to extend between time intervals (it is not a presentist account in no ways) and the future is said to have priority over the other temporal states. Another twist for me in this comparison is that when Heidegger’s account is reconsidered, what he calls as future possibilities seem more like past formalizations that the agent reflects as a future possibility and shapes his current actions accordingly. In any case, the agent (and also the “now”) is extended temporally, unlike in Aristotle, which makes it possible for him to engage in such relations between temporal states. Such solution would be considered to solve Aristotle’s temporal puzzle, I think to some degree, but the incompatibility between the so-called eternal and this-worldly time still remains.
Upon last consideration, I found Aristotle’s first two priority arguments (epistemological and ontological) compatible and coherent, also in a way sharing the same grounds of priority of form over matter in Aristotelian hylomorphic conception of reality; yet there seems to be some problems explicated above regarding temporal priority, leaving aside its emphasis on the secondary substances in the Book 8 of the Θ.
References
Aristotle. (1999) Metaphysics, tr. by Hugh C Lawson-Tancred, London: Penguin Books.
Aristotle. (1936) Physics, tr. by W. D. Ross, Oxford University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. (1996) Being and Time, tr. by Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University of New York.
[1] Aristotle (1999, p.6)
[2] Aristotle (1999, p.79)
[3] Aristotle (1999, p.254)
[4] Aristotle claims in Metaphysics that “truth is a putting-together.” (1999, p.282)
[5] Aristotle (1999, p. 274)
[6] “For the act of building resides in the objectof building and has both its becoming and its being simultaneously with the house.” Aristotle (1999, p.275)
[7] Aristotle (1936, p. 385)
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