HEGEL AND MARX
The relation of Marx to Hegel has been an intensely debated issue especially starting from the development of Western Tradition of Marxism, in which the philosophical debates concerning methodology is one of the core problems of the overall tradition. Among the theoreticians of Western Marxism, Lukacs is probably the first philosopher to deal with the relevance of. Hegel’s conceptual framework to Marxist theory and Hegel’s legacy in general. One is to be assured that, though, these intense philosophical investigations concerning the issues which have seemingly no practical applications at first sight are developed by these theoreticians upon acknowledging a defect in the praxis of prevailing Orthodox Marxism, and this approach is very clear also in Lukacs who investigates for the heal of the practical domain in the domain of theories, i.e. methodology. Later, the above-mentioned legacy has been questioned by many theoreticians who have Western Marxism orientations, such as Marcuse-who intensely lays out the structure and content of Hegel’s nearly all works in his “Reason and Revolution”, as well as one can trace back to Hegelian thought in his major works such as in “One-Dimensional Man” (there his main criticism towards capitalism is the notion of objectification, which is analysed in detail by Lukacs)- and Alhusser-whose positioning Hegel is far more different as a structuralist-and Dussel-who is a 21st century Marxist.
Starting with Lukacs is the most proper approach for this topic, because his positioning of Hegel’s thought will influence the comprehension of the forthcoming Marxists regarding Hegel’s theory in many ways. Lukacs, in his article on the questions of methodology in Marxism and Hegel, called “What is Orthodox Marxism?”, he positions the status of Orthodox Marxism as a differentiated tradition of Marxism which differs from other traditions-here, Lukacs marks the beginning of Western Marxism, I think, due to his analysis on methodology and his positioning the methodology as rather philosophical concept the arbiter between different traditions, not the economy or politics-. Lukacs, in that article claims that the cognition of Orthodox Marxists from the dialectics, which is clearly the most important methodological concept in Marx’s nearly all works thus making it essential to the all interpretations of it, is a materialist and dogmatic one, making them unable to account for the historical processes in which the proletariat plays a part-as this is the main concern of Marxists-in a “true” perspective of social classes. While theorizing such claims, Lukacs is always in position that his conceptualizing is properly depicts the Marx’s methodology itself based on Marx’s rather earlier works, especially the “1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts”. He attempts to conceptualize the notions of “alienation”, “reification”, “totality”, “subject-object dialectics”, “true consciousness”, “humanity”, ”theory-praxis unity” by favoring idealist conception of history just like in Hegel, in which there is an eternal telos of all actions taken in the course of the history will in the end serve the good, or “salvation”, of humanity. Though, as I have said before, this approach has some flaws as it builds unhealable defects in the forthcoming theoreticians theorizing about Marx-Hegel relations as his works are groundbreaking in terms of taking the Marxist tradition to another level. One such defect can be his reference on Marx’s rather earlier works in “History and Class Consciousness”, and also his misattributes to Hegel some concepts that he does not talk about in the way Lukacs thinks about them or in Marx , such as the notion of alienation. I do not mean these donwgrades the theory of his, but it directs the following theoreticians’ conceptualizations and critiques.
The concept of totality is very important in Lukacs, also in Hegel, because the totality is a conceptual framework without which one cannot make sense of the particulars in the system. In Lukacs, the totality of social relations is understood through proletarian consciousness. Thus, the consciousness is not an origin or the starter of the process of revolution or another historical stage (as in Orthodox Marxists, i.e. false consciousness), rather and more importantly it is the achievement or telos which reveals itself in all stages of its development yet never said to be sure. When one reconsiders and evaluates the defects of Orthodox Marxism-the most important of which its lack of dialectics after some point, having dogmatic and static stagist theory of history only-, one may be assured that this reading of Hegel by Lukacs was crucial for any possible further developments of the theory. Also his seeking of praxis, i.e. revolutionary practices in line with Marxism, in the theory and detailed analysis of methodology, is a sign of direct affection by the work of Hegel; because, in Hegel the reconciliation of the theoretical and practical domains is a crucial concept, and provides a well-grounded conceptual framework regarding the relation of how to understand the reality around us and how to change it, after the Kantian rupture between these two domains-to consider the issue in its philosophical roots.
Althusser, on the other hand, as a structural Marxist, denies the essentialist view of history which is the core element of Hegelian Marxists and humanists- that is, the claim that the last instance or telos will determine the the process dialectically. Althusser, on the other hand rejects this vision in his article “Overdetermination and Contradiction” in an attempt to remove dialectics from its idealistic dependents. He argues in short that the alleged telos implies the existence of overdetermination and this conflict makes the notion of contradiction unnecessary to employ; because in the end, everything is and will be reconciled with one another.
Lastly, in 21th century, a Marxist theoretician Dussel, makes detailed analysis on the four drafts of Capital and the usage and influence of Hegelian notions in the Marx’s most important work, the Capital as well as its four drafts. Dussel, though points out the Schelling’s relevance in terms of explaining the creative source of labor which is to have a genesis (it must refer to the outside), unlike the most basic category in Hegel, the notion of Being. This way of understanding helps to conceptualize the notions of surplus value, living labor, and dependency theory.
DUSSEL’S CONTRIBUTION
As a 20th century Marxist theoretician, the authenticity of Enrique Dussel’s contribution to the Marxist theory can be found in his original considerations of Marx’s four drafts of Capital in his article, “The Four Drafts of Capital: Toward a New Interpretation of the Dialectical Thought of Marx”, as well as his analysis of the categories employed in the analysis of the notion of the Capital by Marx himself, tracing back to Hegel’s categories in the Science of Logic with his original interpretation about the contribution of Schelling to bridge the gap between Hegel and Marx. The underlying motive for re-evaluating and re-considering Marxism and for taking Marxism to its roots, that is the Marx himself‒thus, he claims even beyond “post-Marxism”‒lies in the fact that the presumed need to reread Marx today exceeds the one in which the texts are written, England of the 19th century. In the article mentioned above, Dussel provides us with his comprehensive, chronological, archeological rereading of Marx’s four drafts of Capital, Grundrisse being the first draft (1857-8) and the Capital itself to discover the categories which are employed by Marx to explicate the notion of Capital.
In the “Marx, Schelling, and Surplus Value”, one can see his analysis to trace categories employed in Capital in the philosophical accounts of Hegel and of Schelling, which points out the clear rupture between the accounts of Marx and Hegel. I have found his account as having special worth to consider in the Marxist theory, especially when his contribution in terms of considering Hegel and Marx together with their differences at the most abstract therefore difficult level of the Categories (Although Lukacs has deep considerations in the “History and Class Consciousness”, as well as Marcuse, regarding the correspondence between Marx and Hegel, their considerations mainly stay at the level of understanding the effects of the economics on the social domain, i.e. formation of classes etc, which has no direct references in Marx’s later works, i.e. Capital. Thus, their analysis mainly gives a perspective to us on how to relate the earlier Marx with the works of Hegel, unlike Dussel who emphasizes the importance of the collection and publication of the whole Capital, MEGA, including the drafts of the Capital, for the rereading the whole theory of Marx comprehensively in the 21th century.).
TRACING BACK TO HEGEL’S LOGIC
Briefly, in the Science of Logic, what Hegel attempts to achieve is the Notion (Concept) itself by starting from Pure Being with neither external nor internal determinations, for him presuppositionless knowing. This task could be made analogous to the Marx’s project in the Capital, as Marx declares in several places, also as the main theses of Dussel states; that is the project of achieving/or comprehending/or making intelligible to oneself the notion of the Capital starting from the determinationless, most abstract, and immediate category of the value. Hegel, in the doctrine of Being as a first part of his Logic, starts from Pure Being itself, and from the immediate fact that can be achieved with no presupposition that the Pure Being is the same as the Pure Nothing as it contains no determinations; he achieves the notion of “BECOMING” (as pure being is the same as the pure nothing) which will be the crucial for dialectical transition between later categories. The doctrine of being subdivides into three categories; quality, quantity and measure (pure being is the subdivision of the category of quality, which will be followed by the Dasein, being-there, which is the being having the determination of “thereness”; and then being-for-itself.). Then the being is determined quantitatively paving way to the realization of the category of measure as then the previously only qualitatively determined being now both realizes the other beings other than itself (quantitative determination) and be able to make comparisons between them and itself (measurement). The second main subdivision of the Logic leading to the unfolding of the notion of the Concept is the Essence, which starts with the Appearances as a category to be transcended to get the real essence that is intelligible in the being. Dussel makes the following analogies that are intelligible for me as well with his detailed account of them: being and value, dasein and commodity (value in its thing-liness), quality and use-value, quantity and exchange-value, measure and money (can be interpreted as the standardization of the notion of value in the economic domain of quantitatively many commodities), essence and capital, world of appearances and circulation (market). Yet, even in the transition from the notion of Being to the notion of the Essence, Dussel realizes the rupture of Marx from Hegel who emphasizes the identity of Essence with itself in all of the dialectical stages. Dussel declares that as the essence of the Capital is self-expanding due to the notion of the surplus-value, one cannot ensure such an identity relation in Marx. He, then, tries to support his previous claim to make it intelligible the fact that how this essence of Capital is achieved in the system and the dubious notion of surplus-value which never appears in Hegel, by tracing forth to the account of Schelling.
According to Schelling, there exists a rather creationist “creative force” before the notion of Pure Being to pave the way to the process of making intelligible the notion of the pure being (i.e. for him the existence of pure being necessitates the existence of a domain outside of itself, non-Being, to continue with its processes). This “creative force” is in Marx’s account “living labor”, which is the basis of all surplus-value that is crucial to comprehend the notion of the self-expansion of the value. This living labor is the creation/reproduction of value from nothingness; and without firstly commiting the existence of it, one actually cannot ensure the existence of the notion of the value in Marx’s account (unlike Hegel’s, which makes them differentiate in their systematizing the reality for Dussel), and for me Dussel’s analysis touches upon an important and compelling question regarding the comparative consideration between the categories employed in the systems of Hegel and Marx by pointing out the crucial differences and the legacy of Schiller in this correspondence.
CLASSICAL AND WESTERN TRADITIONS OF MARX
There are several main points differentiating the classical and western marxism. For me, the main point of differentiation between two is first their methodology and on what grounds do they base their ideology; second, and also can be seen as a corollary of the first, is that the relation presupposed between politics in the form of burreaucracy and other social and cultural domains.
The prevailing methodological framework for the orthodox marxim of the Second International and the Soviets in general is the “scientific” historical materialism developed by Engels after Marx, the legacy of which is open to discussion with regard to Marx’s own thought itself. Yet, what can be seen in many Second International thinkers is that they end up with the static, dogmatic, positivist, stagist view of the history and social life which is deprived of its dialectics-which is a core concept of methodology that Marx adheres to. Also, as it is clear from reform-revolution debates between Bernstein, Kautsky; and Luxemburg; also from the reign of Stalin (this point can be interpreted as the tyranny is justified as it is thought as a part of a mechanical and unavoidable historical stage.). The increased bureaucratization in Stalin era actually is in conflict with the initial basis of the dialectics. One can claim further that, in terms of methodology, orthodox Marxism favors the practical domain more, yet this should not be understood as it will always bring about the proletariat revolution desired initially. The reason for this is that the dialectical side of the Marxist theory is ignored and the mere positivism regarding historical stages reigns there. This dead-end methodology in which Marxism had no opportunity to develop theoretically and to take action is realized by Lukacs as he annunciates the methodological rupture from the classical Marxists.
In the works of Western Marxists, the density of philosophical analysis in contrast to the classical’s emphasis on politics and economic, is the first thing to realize. Yet, this basic fact does not imply that they fall behind the classicals in terms of the practical side of the theory. As Lukacs explains, the inertia of Marxist action is due to its defects in the theory. Also it is noteworthy to remember his commitment to Hegelian ideas, especially the totality and the sameness of the opposites, making him reconcile better the practical and theoretical domains and work better in the provided framework. Second important distinction between two traditions can be expressed as the differentiated priority they attribute to the base and superstructure model of social life (i.e. economics and culture). In fact, the difference is more than that in most of the time because it is clear that even the approaches and analysis of westerns regarding economics and politics are in mutual affection with their literary theory etc.. One should bear in mind what Marcuse explicates the seemingly free states based on economics actually create the new suppression styles. That is why one need to save as much domain (art, education, science etc.) as one can from the enclosures of state or privatization. And the issue may be taken to the point where the economic and political revolution necessitates the domain outside of itself. At that level, western Marxists have a wide approach to consider such questions.
BESTE GÜN ASLAN 