Throughout the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel makes several references to the problem of evil, or more generally the concept of evil -as we encounter evil both in the domain of cognition, as false, and in the domain of volition, as evil deeds, in the Encyclopedia Logic. What is more, to put the content of “evil” in Hegel’s philosophy as a “problem”, which emphasizes its practicality less, leads several misconceptions in my view; because the concept of evil is employed in Hegel rather instrumentally to overcome inner schism of the Spirit and go back to the initially present unity in will and in cognition. In Hegel’s Logic the roots of “evil” are introduced laying on the same standpoint as the inner schism of the Spirit to which the finitude of thinking (or cognition) and the finitude in willing owe their emergence in the development of the Spirit. In the Preface of the Second Edition of the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel, while criticizing ordinary thought determinations for their finitude, claims in rather romantic manner that with the help of such finite reasoning it is only possible to overcome Evil as an abstract universal (as an abstract universal, Evil is nothing but a contentless concept that is posited against the presupposed absolute goodness, i.e. God, in what Hegel calls “so-called proofs of God”), however evil in particular still remains and this particular evil is worse than the first one for people entrust themselves to it without criticism (Hegel, 6), as they are content with the impossibility of absolute evil in an attitude that abstracts particulars from their universals in their mutual externality in cognition. Yet, in speculative philosophy comprehension and treatment of all particulars are achieved by comprehending their necessary place in the unity, in the whole which makes Hegel’s treatment of evil in both the domain of the particulars and in the domain of the universals as two distinct aspects of looking at the same spiritual development; though they are the same.
In this paper, I will analyze Hegel’s evaluation of the problem of evil based on the Encyclopedia Logic and will claim that to the degree that he reconciled what he calls “particular evils” (that is evil made into a subjective volitional agency) with the idea of absolutely good and true substance, his interpretation is very close to the Spinoza’s conception of good and evil, even though there are important distinctions to be explained regarding the necessity of evil and the role negativity plays.
1. “Evil” and the Spiritual Development of Freedom: “Evil” in the Domain of Volition
Although actualizing the freedom and the act of cognition are the two interrelated parts of the same and one development of the Spirit and they cannot be separable due to interrelatedness of theoretical and practical domains in Hegel, it is convenient to consider them separately to understand the idea of freedom in its development and of self- consciousness, and the relevance of evil to them for Hegel in detail.
Hegel’s main aim in with the speculative philosophy is giving the subjective reason further satisfaction with regard to form, which he describes as necessity (Hegel, 33). Therefore when he mentions the Entzeiwung, rupture from the immediate spiritual unity, he claims man should not stay at this stage of divisiveness from his immediate nature, where he creates purposes from himself all of which belong to the singularization of the subjective spirit with regard to the nature. Furthermore, inasmuch as these purposes are taken to their ultimate limits man begins to will in his particularity without any reference to the universal. Here it can be said that the roots of the “bad” lies in the subjectivity. However, this is a real issue in terms of truth or goodness of an action considered respectively in the theoretical and the particular domains (as they are mostly reconciled in Hegel’s speculative philosophy); because the truth can be grasped only in terms of universals. The content (freedom here, in the domain of practical reasons), unless it shows its necessity and justification in the whole, destined to stay at the level of contingencies which, as its contingent and finite form (freedom of choice or freedom of contingency as Hegel names it) cannot exhaust its real content, cannot be the true content depicted by that form. This truth, needless to say, refers to the “good” of a deed speaking of the practical domain; and its lack is the “evil” or wrong.
As the “evil” in the domain of actions is considered by Hegel in Logic in both the Doctrine of Being and of Essence, in the former as an outcome when “being-for-self is driven to its extremes” and in the latter as in the moments of actuality- especially the actuality of the (concrete) freedom. These will be explained further, yet I will mention first how Hegel regards the theoretical and the practical domain and the relation of freedom and ought as well as his comments on Kant and empiricist philosophers on that issue, based on the First and the Second Parts of the Second Position of Thought with Respect to Objectivity in the Encyclopedia Logic.
While criticizing the empiricism in the Second Position of Thought with Respect to Objectivity, at one point Hegel criticizes empiricism’s lack of the idea of the “ought”: As in empiricism, the great principle that what is true must be in reality and must be there for our perception. By doing this, empiricism actually opposed perception with “ought” and looked down upon the actual that is beyond, as it has its emphasis in subjective understanding (Hegel, 77). Yet, Hegel thinks that although empiricism denied the “ought” which is crucial for understanding the ethical domain of Hegel (Kant, Fichte as well), we should see its merit for being a right moment through realizing the “real freedom”, that we take the given objects and that this is not suffice for comprehension, we ought to see for ourselves, and also cognize ourselves as present in these given objects as well. This is Hegel’s idea of relation between freedom and cognition; that is, we cannot stay at the immediate level of sense experience, with regard to any content, because at this level objects presents themselves as finite with regard to their content, so we-and subjective reason of empiricism and other possible thought-determinations- need further satisfaction with regard to their content, their content must show itself in its development to get rid of its contingencies and to raise itself up to the level of necessity to which the freedom owes its actuality; only in necessity we can comprehend real content of freedom, which –for ordinary understanding- is the irreconcilable opposite of necessity, because we deal with the content as a moment of the whole- as the unity of opposed determinations- in this manner.
In the second part of the section, Hegel turns on considering Kant and his attempt to build unity of self- consciousness between the sense-experience and the intuition- or thinking-that is between the subject and the object that the subject knows. This unity is achieved by means of the pure apperception but this is not related to the any act of subject, instead it is achieved by a transcendental that is only good and beyond our cognition. Yet, this can be still counted as a step forward after empiricism in which there remains no necessary connection between events (or objects) following one another and the subject as Hegel himself severely escapes from. Thinking, when regarded as an activity of the subject, shapes the empirical immediately given reality- this fact is obvious when we consider simply man and his relations to the nature with different means of production, for example, in different stages of history. What is more this can be explained with the principle of negative relation with regard to an activity’s beginnings- for constant change to happen in his speculative philosophy. Yet, what Hegel claims more from this claim that subjective spirit’s activity of thinking essentially alters the empirical form of what is there as given from outside and transforms it into something universal. In fact, I consider the latter as an attempt of Hegel to reconcile content and form truly in his logical system for he believed that there remained no genuine system to comprehend a thing which completely depicts both our subjective labour to grasp that thing and the assumption that the thing has an actuality to be made explicit, without bringing duality into this depiction.
The treatment of the Kantian antinomy between freedom and necessity of Hegel is mainly negative as they are held to be the ideal moments of true freedom and, true necessity as well, in speculative philosophy; this antinomy, as well as the other ones, can be turned into a moment of the truth by sublating one’s thought determination from mere understanding to the comprehension through concept of that truth which includes the understanding as its moments.
Not unexpectedly, there is a duality between the practical and the theoretical domains of reason in Kant which is for Hegel unnecessary distinction because he considers the meaning and merit of the act of cognition in subjective spirit’s trying to make the world into what it ought to be, that is in practical rationality; for as a finite spirit, subject is faced always with an “ought” that comes along with its limits and those limits are not the end of the story as Fichte and Kant considers them to be. That is why my concerns at the beginning regarding the separation of two evils (“evil” as false placed in the theoretical domain and “evil” as regarding actions that is committed only with finite subjective purposes) are a valid concern, at least this separation provides one with considering it in line of other dualistic tendencies. Yet, there is a distinction between them as well, when compared to Spinoza’s denial of practicality of reason.
Practical reason for Kant, when grasped as the will that determines itself in universal way, is the thinking- will which gives objective and imperative laws to freedom; and just in the theoretical domain of Kant no contradictions are allowed as tangible. Yet, Hegel praised Kant, though not for the duality of him between two, which are for Hegel interrelated domains, but for not taking the negative infinite side of the theoretical domain, which asserts that reason should be limited with what is empirical to avoid antinomies (Hegel, 101-102). Instead, Kant provided the willing with the faculty of determining itself universally. Though this does not tell much about what the actuality of what the willing wills and the determination of the good and evil moral action, accordingly, do not stand on as self- determined but instead they are presupposed by making the good as final purpose of all practical reasoning. They are based on the notion of duty, yet it says little about the correspondence of the real state of the world and what happens in our moral states, our subjectivity.
The deeds (which are in such form that can be judged for their goodness or badness) of the “I”, as Kantian unity of apperception, are determined outside of this unity as well as with the means to evaluate them morally as good or evil. This conception of knowing and willing subject falls short when it comes to show its subjective activity; we have only the notion of duty that is too abstract that we cannot understand what is meant by it in reality. Also I mentioned in several places of the paper the relation of evil with the subjectivity and finite determinations. This kind of evil can be explained by regarding the “I” as an instance of being-for- itself. This explanation of the evil at first may seem too individualistic that one wonders how to reconcile it with the cosmic (or universal) evil or simply the evils of society (or any collective finite entity) such as wars, genocides or corruption. For me, that the seemingly great emphasis on the inner struggle of individuals while overcoming the evil is an analogy of how the spirit, as it appears in different forms of collectivity, deals with the evil; in fact the societies or other forms of collective entities can be seen as being- for- themselves, as only qualitatively determined at rather abstract stage of their content’s logical development.
In the Science of Logic, under the category Being- for- itself, roots of the evil are described as the self- destroying of being- for- itself by driving its self- subsistence to its limits therefore ending up with formal and abstract self- subsistence that destroys itself (140), and this creates an abstract freedom out of initially free- to certain determination- being- for- itself. The meaning of this has a special meaning in the idea of evil in Hegel. As a category of the quality, being- for- itself has only the qualitative determinations that are the most poor and abstract which a thing ceases to be itself if it loses these determinations. The first example that Hegel gives as an example of being- for- itself is the “I”, the ego, this concept includes the meaning of something not determined by outside of itself so possesses a certain degree of freedom. This freedom is gained from being in a kind of dialogue with its other, and making its other as its proper moment by comprehending its crucial importance for its being- for- itself. What is condemned above, as I understand it, is rather an inferior meaning of being- for- itself that possesses only repulsion from the forces which it needs to have in order to be being- for- itself (that is attraction and repulsion together). This determines in the qualitative level the One by its own repelling itself from the many and with its attraction towards it. This One is being- for- itself and the many is the all other things which the being- for- itself owes its subsistence. The coming to be conscious of man is closely related with this building the One and by taking this one to its limits entering into different domain of more concrete determinations. This can be explicated by considering natural life and spiritual life respectively for their relation to themselves and what is other from them.
Human beings think and will the universal and they are the universal in- themselves but only as so far as the universal is present for them, as long as of course they have spiritual essence as human beings. Yet animals, as example of natural life, are also in- themselves universals but the universal as such is never be present for them. This point is what distinguishes humans from other simply natural beings and what gives them their dignity, for Hegel. An animal, when confronted with nature or the environment external to it, sees only the singular; the food, other animals. This view of nature is not the ultimate aim of the genuine activity of our spiritual essence yet it shows itself as a moment of the spiritual development in the sense experience clearly (as it has its business only with the particular) and in all ordinary thought determinations until we reach the genuine comprehension activity of the Concept itself. In the encounter with nature, man gets consciousness although nature gives nothing it has to man for himself. He is the inner struggle of spiritual life that makes the external into what is for himself. This moment of consciousness is the first time in which man makes the nature for himself and has the privilege to say “I” as universal, yet in its most abstract manner. Here, it is clear that man owes this consciousness to a certain degree to the nature external to him; this “I” is the One that struggles to be the same “I” among the Many in nature. There are two forces attracting and repelling between them. As long as the repelling is taken to its limits man wills and thinks only in his particularity. This is because the One enters into the misconception (evil, it can be said) that results from the fact that, although it has its real essence in both in itself and what is external to himself, by ignoring this fact it grounds its essence solely on the abstraction of one- sided determination, that is repulsion from the many. From now on it has only the abstract freedom of pure “I”, and this moment is also the passing- over into the quantitative determinations as by building the Many as stage in speculative Concept there occurs a necessity to determine outside determinations that are more concrete than in the first moment of Being. Therefore, willing cannot show its genuine content at this level of the Concept where the determinations are so poor and abstract to build its true nature. The true nature of the willing is its freedom of willing, however at the category of Being which is the most rich in sensory material but the poorest in real determination willing shows itself to be only the willing of the particulars in the form of freedom of choice. In the freedom of choice, the content of the willing, that is freedom does not determine itself both from within and with outside forces, but is determined from outside material; this is freedom in a formal sense only that cannot exhaust its true content and does not have its grounds of its existence within itself but simply outside of itself (that is I choose x from a menu of several options but I, as the One that ignores what is external to my act of choice; as being part of my consciousness of this menu and the act of choice instead, as a volitional subject cannot find my reason to choose x from the menu within myself because at this spurious, rather egoist stage of being- for- itself see the external world merely means to my actions not as possible ends which makes the reconciliation between the object and its knower impossible) . The sublation of freedom of choice through the spiritual development into the real freedom of will is not to be achieved at the category of being or Essence, but in the category of the Concept only when the necessity of both the subjective activity and the external objects are validated for us to talk about genuine freedom and to will at the level of universals therefore avoid the evil of particular purposes.
2. “Evil” as Necessary Moment of Cognition and –consequently- of Actuality
I will consider the interconnectedness of the act of cognition and willing while analyzing the interpretation of the Myth of the Fall given by Hegel in the Encyclopedia Logic, here instead the –inevitably- negative character of evil and its necessary place in cognition is explained.
The falsity is related to the concept of “evil” in Hegel, mainly because it provides a split between substance, which is the Spinozists’ substance that is held to be good and true, and the subjective act of cognition. If one happens to put the good separately from evil or truth from false, one become short of explaining the subjective activity with respect to the good and true substance while the activity is in motion. To know something falsely is defined as there is a disparity between knowledge and its substance, in the Phenomenology of the Spirit. This disparity is a part of cognition itself and it is also the inner motive to give motion to the activity of cognition, that there is always a limit that ought to be overcome while reconciling an object or an action with its concept. The initial separation from substance occurs because the substance is positive and true yet this makes it negative and false inertly because of its determinations of content and distinguishing between self and knowledge. What provides identity to them is exactly this distinguishing. Therefore the initial unity shows itself to be the immediate positive which includes the mediation of the negative and the moment of distinction as the negative that cannot subsists of its own account but to be as such it continues the speculative domain of the concept, do not remain at the negative. We cannot make judgement as true or false, positive or negative, good or evil without concrete determination and limitation of the other. This nature of determinations of reflection is set to be among the most important steps of cognition in the Logic; that their truth consists only in reference to one another, and hence each contains the other within its very concept, without this recognition no proper step in cognition can be made (378).
3. Judgement of “Evil”
There remains one interesting point concerning “evil” as given in the Subjective Concept part of the Logic. Here, judgement of evil action is provided as an example of negative infinite judgement. The separation of judgements according to their quality determinations (and to many other determinations as well) is inherited from transcendental idealism. Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, distinguishes judgements according to their qualities into three categories: affirmative (or positive), negative and infinite judgements (207-208). First two are the same as they are dealt in the formal logic; but the transcendental logic has one more division of judgements, namely the infinite judgement that is not considered in the formal logic. This category can be defined as positing the non- predicate to a subject rather than merely negating the whole sentence (as in saying “It is not the case that…”) and by so doing taking the judgement to a transcendental realm (Therefore positive and negative judgements can be considered as a source of another antinomy in Kant.). This antinomy arises because the domain in which the judgement is made is no longer in the finite realm of the empirical implying beyond human cognition as well.
In Hegel’s consideration though, the infinite judgement is taken no longer as an antinomy but as a higher category that comes out as sublation of both positive and negative judgement and appears as their truth instead. However, there is a problem with this type of judgement that the determinateness of the predicate does not contain the determinateness of the subject nor it is related to its universal sphere which makes it seem nonsensical. Evil action (crime, theft etc.) is an example of this type of judgements for Hegel. Because when we say “This action is non- righteous.” to explicate it is a crime, we are in the domain outside of ethical life as predicate determines (ethical life is considered as the domain of the right). Still we are talking about an action which has no meaning outside of the ethical life, as the practical domain is the one which determines our acts according to their being right or wrong, as what they ought to be instead of what they are. In terms of what considerations the ethical life determines our actions according to its good and evil is a question. This may be related to the universality coming from initial good substance and the subjective activity’s inner drive to overcome the relativity in judgement (of good and evil) pertaining to moral issues to achieve higher reality.
4. The Myth of Fall
Given both the Logic and the Myth of Fall both deals with the origin of consciousness, Hegel gives an interpretation of the myth. Here, man, initially living in natural unity become separated from this unity for this is the part of spiritual life to be for itself, that is it has mediacy implicitly even in its immediate state. This rupture from immediate unity is inevitable because at this state the innocence refers to its other therefore cannot remain as it is. When human is separated from his unity of immediate being they become conscious of themselves. To overcome this separation (also as a curse for his sin), he is destined to labor “in the sweat of his brow”. Because, unlike in natural life, in spiritual life human beings must mediate what is directly given in his subjectivity.
Spirit labors to transform nature and free itself from finiteness. When it goes beyond its natural being- when it transforms nature- , it becomes conscious of itself (become for itself) and it transformed its immediate nature. This is subjective concept of spirit, as it demands necessity in the form of actual, it should not stop at this stage. Because in this separation thinking and willing do not belong to universals; they are particular and finite. At this stage, man become cognizant of good and evil therefore there is freedom of choice, which is for Hegel contingent as its form and content contradicts (Hegel, 218). Freedom of will must have necessity to be actual, therefore man should not stop at freedom of choice between good and evil but should sublate it. From the first point of view, evil arises in these contingencies of of free choice, i.e. man’s creation of purposes from solely himself and willing in particulars. Subjective will later must be get rid of its contingencies to determine itself in necessity and become in accordance with the universality, therefore freedom of spirit is achieved and as far as freedom of choice is a necessary moment of free will so as the evil is for freedom of spirit. From second point of view, evil occurs when man separates itself from natural unity and become conscious of what he is and what is outside him consequently, it is again a necessary moment in spirit through objectivity. There, this necessary moment also includes contingencies which can be removed by free will. The idea of cognition cannot be separable from the idea of good in actions. Therefore as Hegel explicated in the Logic, the idea of good can therefore find its completion only in the idea of the true (732). That is the act of cognition must be in such a way that we, at the end of it, cognize reality in the real freedom of thought itself.
5. Spinoza and “Evil”
In the Ethics, Spinoza interprets the Myth of Fall after the proposition “If man were free they would form no conception of good and evil as long as they were free.” in the section on Human Servitude and Strength of Emotions. This interpretation is very close to the Hegel’s interpretation; yet there are some differences, such as in Spinoza’s account of the Myth of the Fall, when man ate from the tree of cognition of good and evil, he as being deprived of infinite life, began to fear from death- fear for Spinoza is the roots of evil because it causes pain and the knowledge of good or evil is nothing but the emotions of pleasure and pain as long as we are conscious of them. At that stage man realized woman and thought that in his mortal situation nothing can be more useful for him, thus started reproduction. These emotions caused him to lose his freedom but it can be cured by intelligible treatment of human emotions as a part of the nature and understand them in accordance with the objective laws of nature. Spinoza, while considering emotions which deviates the state of man from the goodness of nature and also the state of freedom, determines two kinds of cause as adequate and partial causes; if we can be the adequate cause of modifications which affect us then this emotion means action, also implies thought- in Spinoza the willing and the intellect are the same-, otherwise passion which is the roots of evil. This account is very similar to Hegel’s in that roots of evil are based on the contingencies that are unable to determine content solely within itself but needs outside explication. Therefore, in spite of the substance is solely good unity, with his relation to substance man commits similar unnatural rupture with Hegel’s falling apart from natural unity. What unites them both again is the endeavor of individuals that they commit in case they exist in- themselves with clear and distinct ideas, this endeavor is individual’s demand for persisting in its own being. It is the very essence of that thing to, if it has clear and distinct ideas, get out from immature stage of ideas, i.e. passions, and to persist in its own being. Here Spinoza’s conception of evil is related to the insufficient freedom (i.e. freedom of choice), but for in Spinoza the will is only the necessary will (He rejects the free will on grounds that it is humans’ misconception that there is a final cause of every action. He claims, with this misconception, they justify themselves for taking the means for their desired ends, and relating this instrumentalism to the free will of God that they also have to some degree -in the form of realization of ought. In fact, necessary will binds all nature. I see this claim as a rejection of Hegel’s instrumental use of evil.).
In Hegel, too the lack of freedom is seen as the conception of good and evil; it is necessary for freedom to be contentful and when it shows itself in equality with its opposition with necessity; that is if it can show itself to be necessary the real freedom is achieved. Spinoza, while considering the natural law of reproduction, binds it with the emergence of evil, therefore we can get intuition that there is necessity of evil in his system as well, but this necessity is not something needed to be cognized by subjective activity by humans, instead it is nature’s own issue of determining itself. Therefore in Spinoza there is little emphasis on necessity of evil, and negativity that provides us with dialectics, because of the lack of unity of the opposites and dialectical cognition, once man reach at freedom, judgements of good and evil will be thrown away but in speculative philosophy all levels of freedom, and even the abstract lack of all freedom is contained in the real freedom.
6. Concluding
Upon last consideration I find Hegel’s account of not staying at the level of freedom of choice to achieve free will and therefore to avoid “evil” that results from particular volition as a genuine account of the nature of the “evil” and even I find in this account a practical value of dealing with the evil of the real world at the level of societies, and more collective entities than merely individuals (For example as a form of society- in- itself, neo liberalism can be seen as human’s taking their particular aims to its limits and using nature, and other humans as well, as a part of nature, as merely means. Freedom of choice is also nearly a slogan of this kind of society depending not on the real content of freedom itself but on the contingent valuation of things by the ones who have the market power. Given this is not a society that provides good for at least enough number of people one may consider it in this respect. The claim of Hegel is that the inner struggle of the subjective spirit can provide changes in the whole reality of the world.) Yet, its presupposition of human beings as having a special kind of essence (they are spirit made finite in the form of bodies) sets a barrier to its realization: Once this presupposition does not provide what it means to achieve the good (I do not even mention its possibility of being false), whole account become nonsensical. Therefore, I find Spinoza’s position more in accordance to the reality though it says little about its practicality; that is, even there is one good and true in the nature (as a substance, this is the nature itself) like in Hegel, it is again human consideration to be in conformity with nature and become free in its real sense or not (he says individuals, as modes which God’s attributes are expressed and determines man’s essence, endeavors to persist in that being an individual as long as he has clear and distinct ideas; emphasis on this side is not huge as in Hegel, we can easily turn our attention to the control of natural emotions to be free). Spinoza also rejects the freedom of choice as real freedom, but he also rejects the kind of essence that people can instrumentally use while justifying their actions and freedom. Nature imposes only its laws all of which can be examined empirically, but not “ought” regarding the practical domain of rationality unlike Hegel’s Spirit’s need of fuel to continue its constant becoming and unfolding the goodness.
References
Hegel, G. W. F. The Encyclopedia Logic Part One of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. Trans. T.F. Gereats, W.A. Suchting, H.S. Harris. Hackett Publishing Company, 1991. Print.
Hegel, G. W. F. The Science of Logic. Trans. George di Giovanni. New York. Cambridge University Press, 2010. Print.
Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood. Cambridge University Press, 1998. Print.
Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics. Trans. Edwin Curley. Penguin Books, 1996. Print.
*Cover Image: Lucifer, with Judas in his mouth. The 12th century fresco in the ceiling of St John, Florence
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